Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b] , as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it was recently shown that exact revenue optimization is intractable, even when there is only one bidder . Even for item distributions with special structure, optimal mechanisms have been surprisingly rare [Manelli and Vincent 2006] and the problem is challenging even in the two-item case [Hart and Nisan 2012] . In this paper, we provide a framework for designing optimal mechanisms using optimal transport theory and duality theory. We instantiate our framework to obtain conditions under which only pricing the grand bundle is optimal in multi-item settings (complementing the work of [Manelli and Vincent 2006] ), as well as to characterize optimal two-item mechanisms. We use our results to derive closed-form descriptions of the optimal mechanism in several two-item settings, exhibiting also a setting where a continuum of lotteries is necessary for revenue optimization but a closed-form representation of the mechanism can still be found efficiently using our framework.
ple, and the setting that we study in this paper, is when the bidders have additive valuations with independent values for different items. Here, each bidder's type distribution can be described by providing one marginal distribution per item, saving an exponential amount of information compared to the explicit description. The issue is that such implicit settings turn out to be even more challenging computationally. Indeed, essentially the only known positive results for additive bidders in the implicit setting are for when the values are drawn from Monotone Hazard Rate distributions where [Bhattacharya et al. 2010 ] obtain constant factor approximations to the optimal revenue, and [Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012; Cai and Huang 2013] obtain polynomial-time approximation schemes. For general distributions but a single buyer, [Hart and Nisan 2012] show that selling the items through separate auctions guarantees a O( 1 log 2 n )-fraction of the optimal revenue, which can be improved to 1 2 for 2 items, even if the number of buyers is arbitrary. They also show that in the single-buyer setting with identically distributed items, offering the grand bundle at some optimal price guarantees a O( 1 log n )-fraction of the optimal revenue. At the same time, exact polynomialtime solutions have been recently precluded by , where it is shown that computing optimal mechanisms is #P hard, even when there is a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independent of support 2.
The scarcity of algorithmic results as well as the recent computational lower bound are consistent with our lack of structural understanding of the optimal mechanism in this setting. It had been long known that selling the items separately is sub-optimal. Here is an example from [Hart and Nisan 2012] : Suppose that there are two items and an additive bidder whose values are independent and uniformly distributed in {1, 2}. It is easy to see that selling each item separately results in expected revenue at most 2, while if the auctioneer only offers the bundle of both items for 3, the expected revenue is 2.25. So bundling the items increases revenue. It is also known that, unlike the single-item case, the optimal mechanism need not be deterministic [Thanassoulis 2004; Manelli and Vincent 2006; 2007; Hart and Reny 2011] . Here is an example from : Suppose there are two items and an additive bidder whose values are independent and uniformly distributed in {1, 2} and {1, 3} respectively. In this scenario, the optimal mechanism offers the bundle of both the items at price 4; it also offers at price 2.5 a lottery that, with probability 1/2, gives both items and, with probability 1/2, offers just the first item.
Besides these two insights (that bundling and randomization help) surprisingly little is known about the structure of the optimal mechanism, even in the single-bidder case that we consider in this paper. McAfee and McMillan [1988] proposed conditions under which the optimal mechanism is deterministic, however these were found insufficient by Thanassoulis [2004] and Manelli and Vincent [2006] . The advantage of deterministic mechanisms is that they have a finite description: the price they charge for every possible bundle of the items. Hence looking for the optimal one is feasible, computational considerations aside. On the other hand, randomization adds an extra layer of difficulty: it is possible-we exhibit such an example in Section 11-that the optimal mechanism offers a continuum of lotteries. Hence it is a priori not clear whether one could hope for a concise (even a finite) description of the optimal mechanism, and it is even less clear whether one can optimize over the corresponding space of (infinite-dimensional) mechanisms.
In this paper, we develop a general optimization framework for obtaining closed-form descriptions of optimal mechanisms in multi-item settings with one additive buyer with independent values for the items, where each value is distributed according to a continuous distribution specified by a closed-form description of its probability density function. Our framework is outlined below:
(1) Optimal mechanism design in our setting is known to be reducible to optimizing a specific integral objective of the utility function u : R n ≥0 → R of the buyer, with the constraint that u is increasing, convex, and continuous with gradient ∇u ∈ [0, 1] n almost everywhere; see e.g. [Manelli and Vincent 2006] . We describe this formulation in Section 2.
(2) Our first step is to relax this optimization problem (Section 4) by relaxing the convexity constraint. This constraint is intimately related to the truthfulness of the resulting mechanism; and, when violated, truthfulness and as a consequence revenue optimality are at stake. Regardless, we relax this constraint for developing our framework, and restore it only for our end results. (3) We provide a dual to the relaxed problem, which amounts to the following optimal transport problem: -Input: Two probability measures µ and ν on R n ≥0 , implicitly defined by the buyer's value distributions; -Output: The optimal transport from µ to ν, where the cost of transferring a unit of probability mass from point x to point y is i max{x i − y i , 0}. This dual problem is a continuous analog of minimum-weight bipartite matching. We prove a complementary slackness condition (Theorem 5.1) for certifying optimality of primal and dual solutions. (4) The end products of our dual relaxation, complementary slackness, and restoration of convexity are two structural theorems for optimal mechanism design: -Theorem 7.3 provides a condition under which the optimal mechanism is a take-itor-leave-it offer of the grand bundle at some critical price p * ; p * is not arbitrary but the boundary of a convex region of a particular measure, which we show how to define in Section 7. Instantiating Theorem 7.3, -(exponential distributions) we analytically derive the optimal mechanism for two items distributed according to exponential distributions with arbitrary parameters λ 1 , λ 2 ; we show that the optimal mechanism offers two options: (i) the grand bundle at some price and (ii) at a different price, the item with the thinner tail with probability 1 and the other item with probability min{λi} max{λi} ; see Section 9. -(power-law distributions) we exhibit a setting with two items distributed according to non-identical power law distributions where the optimal mechanism only offers the grand bundle; see Section 8. -Theorem 10.3 provides our general characterization of the optimal mechanism for two items. The characterization applies to settings that are canonical according to Definition 10.2. Under this condition, the optimal mechanism is succinctly described in terms of a decreasing, concave and continuous function in R 2 : all types under this function are allocated nothing and pay nothing; all other types are matched to a point of the function, in some canonical way specified by Theorem 10.3, and their allocation probabilities correspond to derivatives of the function at the corresponding point. Using our general theorem, -(beta distributions) we exhibit a setting with two items distributed according to non-identical beta distributions where the optimal mechanism offers a continuum of lotteries; see Example 11.1 in Section 11. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known explicit setting with two independent values where the optimal mechanism comprises a continuum of lotteries. (5) In the proofs of our structural theorems, we employ Strassen's theorem on stochastic domination of measures [Lindvall 1999] . As a consequence of our proof technique, we introduce a condition on stochastic domination in both our results. As it may be cumbersome to check stochastic domination, we develop an alternate condition (see Theorem 7.4) that implies stochastic domination. Our new condition is of independent interest to measure theory, and will be useful to the user of our results. Indeed, we rely on it for all our 2-item applications described above.
THE REVENUE-MAXIMIZATION PROGRAM
We aim to find the revenue-optimal mechanism M for selling n goods to a single additive bidder whose values z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) for the goods are drawn independently from probability distributions with given densities f i (z i ) : R ≥0 → R ≥0 , for all i. M takes as input the vector z of bidder's values and outputs the probability with which he will receive each good along with the price that he needs to pay for this allocation. That is, M consists of two functions P : R n ≥0 → [0, 1] n and T : R n ≥0 → R that give, respectively, the vector of allocation probabilities and the price that the bidder pays, as a function of the bidder's values.
The bidder receives utility U(z, p, t) = z · p − t when his values for the items are z and he is offered the items with probabilities p at price t.
We restrict our attention to mechanisms that are incentive compatible, meaning that the bidder must have adequate incentives to reveal his values for the items truthfully, and individually rational, meaning that the bidder has an incentive to participate in the mechanism.
Definition 2.1. The mechanism M is incentive compatible (IC) if and only if
Definition 2.2. The mechanism M is individually rational (IR) if and only if
When we enforce the IC constraints, we can assume that the buyer truthfully reports his type to the mechanism. Under this assumption, let u : R n ≥0 → R be the function that maps the buyer's valuation to the utility he receives by the mechanism M. We have that u(z) = U(z, P(z), T (z)).
As noted in Manelli and Vincent [2006] , the mechanism can be uniquely determined by providing its corresponding utility function u. We readily use the characterization that the mechanism is IC if and only if u is non-decreasing, convex, continuous, and ∇u ∈ [0, 1] n almost everywhere. We additionally require that u(z) ≥ 0 to satisfy the IR constraint. Given u we can compute the functions P and T by using the fact that P(z) = ∇u(z) and
Therefore, to find the revenue-optimal mechanism, we need to determine, given the probability density function f (z) = i f i (z i ), a nonnegative, nondecreasing, convex and continuous function u with ∇u ∈ [0, 1] n almost everywhere such that the integral shown below (which equals the expected revenue) is maximized:
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions about the distribution of the buyer's value for each item: -The points where
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To maximize revenue, we aim for u to be large on X yet small on Y. We define the density functions µ
· y and define the corresponding measures µ X and ν Y on X and Y, respectively. With this notation, our problem is to find the function u :
subject to the constraints mentioned in Section 2.
1 We notice that u(d − ) = 0 in any optimal mechanism.
2 Furthermore, we will show momentarily that µ
For technical reasons, we desire for the masses of the spaces to be equal under their respective measures, and we therefore insert the point d − into X by defining the space X 0 X ∪ {d − }, and extending µ X by setting µ
We note that D (−∇f (z) · z − (n + 1)f (z))dz is the expected revenue under the constant utility function u(z) = 1. (To see this recall that (2) represents the expected revenue under utility function u.) The expected revenue in this case is −1 (see this by plugging u(·) = 1 into (1), which is the alternative expression for expected revenue), and thus
In summary, our goal is to find the function u : D → R which maximizes
subject to the constraints that u is nondecreasing, convex, continuous and ∇u ∈ [0, 1] n almost everywhere, and
, while X is the region in which the quantity is positive. We define X 0 = X ∪ {d − }, and set
In all examples considered in this paper, d − is "surrounded" only by points in the Y region.
Example 3.1 (Exponential Distribution). Suppose that the pdf of each item i is given by
We also have
where µ X d and ν Y d are defined on X and Y, respectively. We extend µ X to the space X 0 by setting µ X0 ({ 0}) = 1.
Example 3.2 (Power-Law Distribution). Suppose that the pdf of item i is given by
Finally, we extend the measure µ X to the space X 0 by setting µ X0 ({ 0}) = 1.
THE RELAXED PROBLEM
We define the "cost function" c :
We notice that, if u satisfies our constraint that ∇u ∈ [0, 1] n almost everywhere and is continuous, we have as a consequence that u(x) − u(y) ≤ c(x, y) for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y. We therefore consider the relaxed problem of maximizing
for all x ∈ X 0 and all y ∈ Y. The optimal value of this relaxed program is therefore at least as large as the optimal revenue of the mechanism design program. We hope to identify scenarios in which we can solve the relaxed problem and in which the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies all of the original constraints. Indeed, if the relaxed problem's solution satisfies all original constraints, the solution is also optimal for the original problem.
DUAL RELAXED PROBLEM
Consider the problem
is the set of all measures on X 0 × Y with marginal measures µ X0 and ν Y , respectively.
3 We call this the dual relaxed problem. Informally, this problem asks for the minimum cost way of "transporting mass" to change the measure ν Y into the measure µ X0 , and is a continuous analog of the minimum-weight bipartite matching problem. Analogous to Monge-Kantorovich duality from optimal transport theory [Villani 2009 ], we have the following theorem, which is a continuous version of the relationship between minimumweight bipartite matching and its linear programming dual:
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that there exist u * , γ * feasible for the relaxed problem and the dual relaxed problem, respectively, such that u * (x) − u * (y) = c(x, y), γ * -almost surely. Then u * is optimal for the relaxed problem and γ * is optimal for the dual relaxed problem.
Proof. We have
for any feasible u and γ. Therefore, the optimal value of the relaxed primal is at most 1/ν(Y) times the optimal value of the relaxed dual. We also have
Since we have found u * and γ * such that the value of the relaxed primal is exactly 1/ν Y (Y) the value of the relaxed dual, we conclude that u * and γ * are both optimal for their respective problems.
We may sometimes refer to γ * as an optimal transport map between X 0 and Y, since it represents the lowest-cost method of transporting mass between the two measure spaces.
STRASSEN'S THEOREM AND STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE
Our overall goal is to find u * and γ * satisfying the conditions of Theorem 5.1, and thereby are optimal for their respective problems. However, it may be difficult to explicitly define an appropriate measure γ * ∈ Γ(µ X0 , ν Y ). Instead, we will often make use of a theorem of Strassen, which allows us to prove the existence of such γ * by demonstrating that one measure stochastically dominates another. (Informally, measure α "stochastically dominates" β if β can be transformed into α by moving mass only in positive directions.) Definition 6.1. We denote by the partial ordering on R n ≥0 where a b if and only if a i ≤ b i for all i. In terms of this partial ordering, we make the following definitions.
A function f :
n is increasing if a ∈ S and a b implies b ∈ S, and decreasing if a ∈ S and b a implies b ∈ S.
Definition 6.2. For two measures α, β on R n ≥0 , we say that α stochastically dominates β (with respect to the partial order ), denoted
f dβ for all increasing bounded measurable functions f . 5 Similarly, if g, h are density functions, h g if
We now apply a theorem of Strassen for the partial order , using the formulation from Lindvall [1999] and noting that the set {(a, b) : a b} is closed:
Theorem 6.3 (Strassen). If α and β are probability measures on R n ≥0 and α stochastically dominates β with respect to , then there exists a probability measureγ ∈ Γ(α, β) on R n ≥0 × R n ≥0 with marginals α and β respectively such thatγ({(a, b) : b a}) = 1. The choice of is justified by the following observation (as will become clear in the next section): if types x ∈ X and y ∈ Y both receive the grand bundle at price p under a utility function u, then u(x) − u(y) = c(x, y) if and only if y x.
OPTIMALITY OF GRAND BUNDLING
Our goal in this section is to identify conditions under which the solution to the relaxed problem is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle for some price p * . In this case, the relaxed solution is clearly also a solution of the original mechanism design instance. (In particular, the utility function is convex.) Our proof of optimality relies on Theorem 5.1.
Definition 7.1. For any p > 0, we define Z p and W p by
That is, Z p (along with d − ) is the set of types which will receive no goods under the grand bundle price p. We aim to find a price p such that Z p ⊆ Y and such that our transport map can send all of Z p to {d − }.
Definition 7.2. We say that p * > 0 is a critical bundle price if Z p * ⊆ Y and
critical bundle price and µ X | W p * ν Y | W p * , then a take-it-or-leave-it offer of all items for p * is the optimal mechanism. While this diagram is drawn with n = 2, the result holds for arbitrary n.
Even if a critical bundle price p * exists, it is not necessarily true that the optimal mechanism is a simple take-it-or-leave-it offer of all goods for price p * .
Theorem 7.3. Suppose that there exists a critical bundle price p
Then the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle for price p * .
6
Proof. Suppose that there exists such a critical bundle price p * . By Strassen's theorem,
such that, for x ∈ W p * ∩ X and y ∈ W p * ∩ Y, it holds that x y, γ * 1 almost-surely. Since x and y are in W p * , a bidder of either type receives the grand bundle for price p * . Thus, under the utility u * of the bundling mechanism:
where the final equality follows from x y. We now extend γ * 1 to a transport map γ * ∈ (µ X0 , ν Y ) by mapping between d − ∈ X 0 and all of Z p * ⊆ Y. Indeed, such a map exists since
We notice that any bidder of type y ∈ Z p * or d − receives zero utility under u * . Thus, we have u
The existence of the transport map γ * proves that the bundling utility function u * is optimal for the relaxed problem, by Theorem 5.1. Since u * clearly satisfies all of the original mechanism design constraints, it is indeed the utility function of the optimal mechanism.
It is oftentimes difficult to verify directly that
In two dimensions, we will make use of Theorem 7.4, which provides a sufficient condition for a measure to stochastically dominate another. This theorem is an application of the lemma (proven in the full version) that an equivalent condition for dominance is that one measure has more mass than the other on all sets which are the union of finitely many "increasing boxes." Under the conditions of Theorem 7.4, we are able to induct on the number of boxes by removing one box at a time. For application to Theorem 7.3, we only need to use Theorem 7.4 in the special case that C = D and R = Z p * , but in Section 9 we will use the more general form of the theorem. The proof of Theorem 7.4 is in the full version of this paper.
6 If α is a measure and S ⊂ R n ≥0 , then the restriction α| S is the measure such that α| S (A) α(A ∩ S) for all measurable A.
Informally, Theorem 7.4 deals with the scenario where two density functions, g and h, are both nonzero only on some set C \ R, where R is a decreasing subset of C. To prove that g h, it suffices to verify that (1) g − h has an appropriate form (2) the integral of g − h on C is positive and (3) if we integrate g − h along either a vertical or horizontal line outwards starting from any point in R, the result is negative.
+ 2 ), R be a decreasing nonempty subset of C, and g, h : C → R ≥0 be bounded density functions which are 0 on R, have finite total mass, and satisfy
-For any basis vector e i ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} and any point z * ∈ R:
-There exist non-negative functions α :
and an increasing function η : C → R such that
Then g h.
When we prove optimality of grand bundling, we will apply Theorem 7.4 with g and h being the densities of µ X | W p * and ν Y | W p * , respectively.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: BUNDLING TWO POWER-LAW ITEMS
In this section, we derive, as an application of Theorem 7.3, the optimal mechanism for an instance of selling two goods which are distributed according to power-law distributions. We exhibit that the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle, and we find the right price to charge for it. Unlike our example in the next section for exponentially distributed items (where we perform our calculations for arbitrary pairs of exponential distributions), here we demonstrate how numerical computations can be used to prove optimality of grand bundling in a single instance. Indeed, since the integrals involved in our computations may be complicated, we suspect that this numerical approach will frequently be useful.
We proceed with our goal of deducing the optimal mechanism for selling two goods, where the distribution of each good has probability density function f i (z i ) = ci−1 (1+zi) c i for z i ∈ [0, ∞). In this example, we fix c 1 = 6 and c 2 = 7.
Numerically Computing the Critical Bundle Price
We begin by computing the critical bundle price p * , as prescribed by Definition 7.2. In particular, we first solve for p * such that
and numerically determine that p * ≈ .35725. Thus, if there indeed exists a critical bundle price, it must have value p * . Next, to confirm that p * is a critical bundle price, we must verify that Z p * ⊆ Y. That is, we must show that for all z with z 1 + z 2 ≤ p * , it holds that
Since the left-hand side of the inequality is an increasing function, it suffices to prove the inequality when z 1 + z 2 = p * . Substituting for z 2 , the left-hand side of the above inequality becomes
1+p * −z1 . We numerically compute, after setting c 1 = 6 and c 2 = 7, that the expression is maximized by z 1 = 0.133226, achieving value 1.98654. Since 1.98654 is significantly less than 3, we conclude that p * is indeed a critical price, even taking into consideration possible errors of precision.
Verifying Stochastic Dominance
Given Theorem 7.3, all that remains to prove optimality of grand bundling is to verify that
We prove this stochastic dominance using Theorem 7.4 with g = µ
Indeed, Theorem 7.4 applies in this case, and the verification of stochastic dominance is in the full version of this paper. In conclusion, we obtain:
Example 8.1. The optimal mechanism for selling two independent goods with densities f 1 (z 1 ) = 5/(1 + z 1 ) 6 and f 2 (z 2 ) = 6/(1 + z 2 ) 7 respectively is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the bundle of the two goods for price p * ≈ .35725.
COMPLETE SOLUTION FOR TWO EXPONENTIAL ITEMS
In this section we provide a closed-form description of the optimal mechanism for two independent exponentially distributed items. The description of the optimal mechanism is given by Theorem 9.3. In this case, the optimal mechanism has richer structure than only offering the grand bundle at some price. In the next subsections, when it does not provide significant additional complications, we perform computations for n exponentially distributed items, as these calculations may prove useful in extensions of our result. We denote by λ i the parameters of the exponential distributions, and by λ min = min i λ i and λ max = max i λ i 9.1. The Critical Price p * Definition 9.1. For any 0 < p ≤ 2/λ min , we define the zero space,
See Figure 3 for an example of a zero space. In terms of Z ′ p we make the following definition.
Note that the critical price differs from the critical bundle price defined in Section 7 in that the critical price is defined with respect to the space Z
Claim 2. For all λ 1 , λ 2 > 0, the critical price is well-defined.
Proof. We need to show that there is a unique solution to the equation defining the critical price.
We note that ν Y (Z λ i y i ≤ 2} , and we now compute
as desired.
Our goal in the remainder of this section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 9.3. For all λ 1 ≥ λ 2 > 0, the optimal utility function is the following:
is the critical price of Definition 9.2. In particular, the optimal mechanism offers the following menu:
(1 ) Receive nothing, pay 0.
(2 ) Receive the first item with probability 1 and the second item with probability λ 2 /λ 1 , pay 2/λ 1 . (3 ) Receive both items, pay p * .
The Absorption Hyperplane
A useful feature of independent exponential distributions is that our measures µ X0 and ν Y give rise to a set H ⊂ R n ≥0 , for which integrating the difference of the densities of µ X0 and ν Y outwards along any line starting from H yields 0. This set H provides useful geometric intuition behind the structure of the optimal mechanism. Claim 3. Suppose z ∈ R n ≥0 satisfies λ j z j = n. Then, for any vector v ∈ R n ≥0 :
We refer to the set H = {z ∈ R n ≥0 : z i λ i = n} as the absorption hyperplane, since integrating (n + 1 − λ i x i )e − λixi starting from any point in the set and going outwards in any positive direction gives 0.
Proof of Optimality
In this section, we prove Theorem 9.3, which fully specifies the optimal mechanism for two independent exponentially-distributed items.
By Theorem 5.1, we must prove that there exists γ
* -almost surely. Our transport map γ * will be decomposed into γ 1 + γ 2 + γ 3 , where (see Figure 3 for reference)
, where B = z : λ 1 z + λ 2 z > 2 and z 2 λ1−λ2 λ1
such that u p * (x) − u p * (y) = c(x, y) γ i -almost surely for all i. We note that for each γ i , the marginal distributions of µ and ν that we are seeking to couple have the same total mass. Fig. 4 . To prove the existence of γ 3 , we must show that
We proceed to prove the existence of each γ i separately.
(
Therefore, since u p * (y) = 0 for all y ∈ Z p * , the equality u( 0) − u(y) = c(x, y) is trivially satisfied for all y ∈ Z ′ p * . We can therefore take γ 1 to assign probability mass to ({ 0}×Z) equal to ν
We note that B consists of all points to the right of the absorption hyperplane with z 2 coordinate less than a particular threshold. Therefore, for any z * 2 , we have by Claim 3:
From this we deduce that we can choose the measure γ 2 ∈ Γ(µ X0 | B∩X0 , ν Y | B∩Y ) so that positive density is only placed on pairs of points (x, y) with x 2 = y 2 , i.e. with their second coordinates equal. Indeed, we notice that, for x ∈ B ∩ X 0 and y ∈ B ∩ Y,
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Therefore, if x 2 = y 2 (which we take to hold γ 2 -almost surely), then u p * (x) − u p * (y) = x 1 − y 1 = c(x, y), as desired. (3) In region W, our mechanism sells the grand bundle for price p * . To prove the existence of measure γ 3 , it suffices to prove that µ X0 | W∩X0 ν Y | W∩Y , as illustrated in Figure 4 . Indeed, then Strassen's theorem (Theorem 6.3) implies that γ 3 ∈ Γ(µ X0 | W∩X0 , ν Y | W∩Y ) exists so that pairs of points (x, y) sampled from γ 3 satisfy y x almost surely, which in turn implies that u p * (x) − u p * (y) = (x 1 + x 2 − p * ) − (y 1 + y 2 − p * ) = c(x, y) almost surely. The desired stochastic dominance follows from Theorem 7.4, taking g and h to be the density functions of µ X0 | W∩X and ν Y | W∩Y , respectively, and noticing that, restricted within W, Z ′ p * lies below the absorption hyperplane.
7
This concludes the proof of Theorem 9.3. We notice that, if p * ≤ 2/λ max , then the region B is empty, and Z ′ p * is simply the region below the 45
• line given by z 1 + z 2 = p * .
Corollary 9.4. If p * ≤ 2/λ max , then the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the grand bundle for price p * .
GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF TWO-ITEM OPTIMAL MECHANISMS
We now generalize the approach of Section 9 to further understand the structure of optimal mechanisms. The following definition is summarized by Figure 5 .
Definition 10.1. A canonical zero set for the two-item optimal mechanism design problem is a nonempty closed subset Z of D 1 ×D 2 , where Z is decreasing and convex. We denote by s : [d 8 That is:
, c] and z 2 ≤ s(z 1 ) . We require that s be differentiable almost everywhere.
We denote by a, b
A canonical zero set Z gives rise to a canonical partition of D 1 × D 2 into four regions, Z, A, B, W, where: Figure 5 .
If a canonical partition is well-formed according to the following definition, then Theorem 10.3 characterizes the structure of the optimal mechanism. Definition 10.2. A canonical partition s, Z, A, B, W is well-formed if the following conditions are satisfied:
-The following equality holds:
i.e. the mass assigned by ν Y to Z equals µ X0 ({d − }).
µ X place the exact same mass on every vertical line originating from a point (z 1 , s(z 1 )),
and µ X place the exact same mass on every horizontal line that starts from a point (s
and going rightwards. -For all increasing subsets T ⊆ W, it holds that:
Theorem 10.3. Let s, Z, A, B, W be a well-formed canonical partition of D 1 ×D 2 . Then the optimal mechanism behaves as follows for a bidder of declared type (z 1 , z 2 ):
-If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ Z, the bidder receives no goods and is charged 0.
-If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ A, the bidder receives item 1 with probability −s ′ (z 1 ), item 2 with probability 1, and is charged s(z 1 ) − z 1 s ′ (z 1 ). -If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ B, the bidder receives item 1 with probability 1, item 2 with probability −1/s ′ (s −1 (z 2 )), and is charged s −1 (z 2 ) − z 2 /s ′ (s −1 (z 2 )). -If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ W, the bidder receives both goods with probability 1 and is charged a + s(a) (where a is as specified in Definition 10.1).
Note that Theorem 10.3 is symmetric with respect to relabeling z 1 and z 2 and replacing s, a, b, and c with s −1 , s −1 (b), s −1 (a), and s −1 (0), respectively. Furthermore, we observe that Theorem 9 is a special case of this theorem, with Z = Z ′ p * and A being empty. Proof. The utility function u induced by the mechanism is as follows:
-If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ Z, the utility is 0.
-If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ A, the utility is z 2 − s(z 1 ).
-If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ B, the utility is z 1 − s −1 (z 2 ). -If (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ W, the utility is z 1 + z 2 − (a + s(a)).
It is straightforward to show that there exists a transport map γ dual to u, and therefore u is optimal for the relaxed problem. Indeed, γ maps between {d − } and Z, between A ∩ X and A ∩ Y, between B ∩ X and B ∩ Y, and between W ∩ X and W ∩ Y. The full argument for the existence of γ is nearly identical to the argument given in the proof of Theorem 9. In particular, the existence of an appropriate map between W ∩ X and W ∩ Y follows from Strassen's theorem.
Since a solution to the relaxed problem is not necessarily a solution to the original mechanism design instance, it remains to show that the mechanism is truthful (or, equivalently, that u is convex). We consider a bidder of type (z 1 , z 2 ), and let (z * 1 , z * 2 ) be any other type. It is straightforward to prove, through a small amount of casework, that that the bidder's utility never increases by declaring (z 1 z2 (−∇f (z 1 , t) · (z 1 , t) − (n + 1)f (z 1 , t)) dt = 0. That is, starting from any point in z ∈ S top and integrating µ X d (z 1 , t) − µ Y d (z 1 , t) "upwards" from t = z 2 to t = 1 yields zero. Similarly, we say that (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ S right if 1 z1 (−∇f (t, z 2 ) · (t, z 2 ) − (n + 1)f (t, z 2 )) dt = 0. Notice that, since X is an increasing set, S top and S right must both be subsets of Y. We compute analytically that (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ [0, 1) 2 is in S top if and only if . In particular, for any z 1 ∈ [0, .63718) there exists a z 2 such that (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ S right , and there does not exist such a z 2 if z 1 > .63718. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify (by computing second derivatives in the appropriate regime) that the region below S top and the region below S right are convex.
Step (ii). We now compute p * = 0.71307 (this choice will be explained later-it is the z 2 -intercept of the 45
• line in Figure 6 and f 2 (z 2 ) = z 2 2 (1−z 2 ) 3 B(3,4)
